RT Article
T1 Changing One’s Mind on Moral Matters
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 8
IS 3
SP 277
OP 290
A1 Cowley, Christopher
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2005
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1785693468
AB Contemporary moral philosophy assumes an account of what it means to legitimately change one’s mind in ethics, and I wish to challenge this account by enlarging the category of the legitimate. I am just as eager to avoid illegitimate mind-changing brought on by deceit or brainwashing, but I claim that legitimacy should be defined in terms of transparency of method. A social reformer should not be embarrassed to admit that he acquired many beliefs about justice while reading Dickens. As such, appeals to the heart and the imagination are just as legitimate, within limits, as appeals to the mind; and showing can be as legitimate as telling. To demonstrate this, I consider the example of a vegetarian trying to ‘convert’ a carnivore. I then ask what it means when the carnivore claims to have been previously mistaken.
K1 Wittgensteinian ethics
K1 Peter Singer
K1 Moral Reasons
K1 moral persuasion
K1 Moral Imagination
K1 Cora Diamond
K1 Animal Rights
DO 10.1007/s10677-005-0351-y