Function, Intuition and Ends in Aristotle's Ethics
This essay attempts to show why deliberation is not of ends for Aristotle, not only because deliberation is concerned with means, but because ends are grasped by wish. Such wishing, I argue, is a form of rational intuition that is non-discursive and analogous to seeing and therefore not at all like...
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Caricamento...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Pubblicazione: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2006
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Anno: 2006, Volume: 9, Fascicolo: 2, Pagine: 187-200 |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Contemplation
B wish B Function B Deliberation B Nicomachean Ethics B Ends B Intuizione B Aristotle |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Riepilogo: | This essay attempts to show why deliberation is not of ends for Aristotle, not only because deliberation is concerned with means, but because ends are grasped by wish. Such wishing, I argue, is a form of rational intuition that is non-discursive and analogous to seeing and therefore not at all like the discursive thought involved in deliberation. Such a reading also helps shed light on the nature of contemplation and therefore on happiness in Aristotle. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-006-9015-9 |