Naturalistic Explanations of Apodictic Moral Claims: Brentano’s Ethical Intuitionism and Nietzsche’s Naturalism
In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing how genealogical explanations of even apodictic...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
Lenguaje: | Inglés |
Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2007
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En: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Año: 2007, Volumen: 10, Número: 2, Páginas: 159-182 |
Otras palabras clave: | B
Psychologism
B Evolutionary Ethics B Darwinian ethics B Nietzsche B Intuitionism B Moral Intuition B Naturalism B genetic fallacy B Naturalistic Fallacy B Brentano’s ethics |
Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Sumario: | In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing how genealogical explanations of even apodictic moral claims are logically possible (albeit only if certain unlikely, stringent conditions are met); (3) I show how Nietzsche’s ethics meets these stringent conditions, but evolutionary ethics does not. My more general thesis is that naturalism and intuitionism in ethics need not be mutually incompatible. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-006-9055-1 |