Naturalistic Explanations of Apodictic Moral Claims: Brentano’s Ethical Intuitionism and Nietzsche’s Naturalism

In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing how genealogical explanations of even apodictic...

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Главный автор: Moosa, Imtiaz (Автор)
Формат: Электронный ресурс Статья
Язык:Английский
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Опубликовано: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2007
В: Ethical theory and moral practice
Год: 2007, Том: 10, Выпуск: 2, Страницы: 159-182
Другие ключевые слова:B Psychologism
B Evolutionary Ethics
B Darwinian ethics
B Nietzsche
B Intuitionism
B Moral Intuition
B Naturalism
B genetic fallacy
B Naturalistic Fallacy
B Brentano’s ethics
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Итог:In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing how genealogical explanations of even apodictic moral claims are logically possible (albeit only if certain unlikely, stringent conditions are met); (3) I show how Nietzsche’s ethics meets these stringent conditions, but evolutionary ethics does not. My more general thesis is that naturalism and intuitionism in ethics need not be mutually incompatible.
ISSN:1572-8447
Второстепенные работы:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-006-9055-1