Moral Self-Knowledge in Kantian Ethics

Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart—the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by...

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Autor principal: O’Hagan, Emer (Author)
Tipo de documento: Recurso Electrónico Artigo
Idioma:Inglês
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Publicado em: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2009
Em: Ethical theory and moral practice
Ano: 2009, Volume: 12, Número: 5, Páginas: 525
Outras palavras-chave:B Duty
B Self-deception
B Self-knowledge
B Casuistry
B Kant
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Descrição
Resumo:Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart—the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as sound moral practice requires moral self-knowledge and moral self-knowledge requires a theoretical commitment to a conception of the moral self, sound moral agency is for Kant crucially tied to theory. Kant plausibly holds that self-knowledge is a protection against moral confusion and self-deception. I conclude that although his account relies too heavily on the awareness of moral law to explain its connection to moral development, it is insightful and important in Kantian ethics.
ISSN:1572-8447
Obras secundárias:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-009-9181-7