RT Article
T1 Responsibility and the Brain Sciences
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 12
IS 5
SP 511
OP 511
A1 De Brigard, Felipe
A1 Mandelbaum, Eric
A1 Ripley, David
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2008
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1785695355
AB Some theorists think that the more we get to know about the neural underpinnings of our behaviors, the less likely we will be to hold people responsible for their actions. This intuition has driven some to suspect that as neuroscience gains insight into the neurological causes of our actions, people will cease to view others as morally responsible for their actions, thus creating a troubling quandary for our legal system. This paper provides empirical evidence against such intuitions. Particularly, our studies of folk intuitions suggest that (1) when the causes of an action are described in neurological terms, they are not found to be any more exculpatory than when described in psychological terms, and (2) agents are not held fully responsible even for actions that are fully neurologically caused.
K1 Law
K1 Mental Illness
K1 Experimental philosophy
K1 Free Will
K1 Neuroscience
K1 Responsibility
DO 10.1007/s10677-008-9143-5