Because I Believe It’s the Right Thing to Do
Our beliefs about which actions we ought to perform clearly have an effect on what we do. But so-called “Humean” theories—holding that all motivation has its source in desire—insist on connecting such beliefs with an antecedent motive. Rationalists, on the other hand, allow normative beliefs a more...
Главный автор: | |
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Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
Язык: | Английский |
Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Опубликовано: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2013
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В: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Год: 2013, Том: 16, Выпуск: 4, Страницы: 791-808 |
Другие ключевые слова: | B
Rationalism
B Humean theory of motivation B Humeanism B Internalism B Externalism B Evaluative beliefs |
Online-ссылка: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Итог: | Our beliefs about which actions we ought to perform clearly have an effect on what we do. But so-called “Humean” theories—holding that all motivation has its source in desire—insist on connecting such beliefs with an antecedent motive. Rationalists, on the other hand, allow normative beliefs a more independent role. I argue in favor of the rationalist view in two stages. First, I show that the Humean theory rules out some of the ways we ordinarily explain actions. This shifts the burden of proof onto Humeans to motivate their more restrictive, revisionary account. Second, I show that they are unlikely to discharge this burden because the key arguments in favor of the Humean theory fail. I focus on some of the most potent and most recent lines of argument, which appeal to either parsimony, the teleological nature of motivation, or the structure of practical reasoning. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-012-9394-z |