RT Article
T1 Revising Reasons Reactivity: Weakly and Strongly Sufficient Reasons for Acting
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 17
IS 3
SP 529
OP 543
A1 Waller, Robyn Repko
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2014
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1785698273
AB In Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza propose an account of moral responsibility according to which an agent is morally responsible for an action just when that action is the product of her own moderately reasons-responsive mechanism, where reasons-responsiveness is explained in terms of the mechanism’s regular reasons-receptivity and weak reasons-reactivity. In a review of Fischer and Ravizza’s book Mele contends that their weakly reasons-reactivity condition is inadequate, constructing a case in which, according to their theory, an extreme agoraphobic is morally responsible for his staying in his home. In this paper I modify Fischer and Ravizza’s account of moral responsibility in light of Mele’s problematic example, suggesting a refinement of their weakly reasons-reactivity requirement via a distinction between weakly sufficient reasons and strongly sufficient reasons.
K1 Alfred Mele
K1 John Martin Fischer
K1 Reasons
K1 Weakness of will
K1 Moral Responsibility
DO 10.1007/s10677-013-9460-1