RT Article
T1 Moral Responsibility: Justifying Strawson and the Excuse of Peculiarly Unfortunate Formative Circumstances
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 17
IS 3
SP 545
OP 557
A1 Ciurria, Michelle
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2014
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1785698281
AB P.F. Strawson’s theory of moral responsibility remains eminently influential. However, moral philosophers such as G. Watson and T.M. Scanlon have called into question it explanatory basis, which grounds moral responsibility in human nature and interpersonal relationships. They demand a deeper normative explanation for when it is appropriate to modify or mollify the reactive attitudes. In this paper, following A. Sneddon, I argue that the best interpretation of Strawson is an externalistic one which construes moral responsibility as an interpersonal social competence, as this approach uniquely satisfies Strawson’s demand that we justify the reactive attitudes from within the participant perspective. I then show that this is the only interpretation capable of preserving Strawson’s well-known excuse of being peculiarly unfortunate in one’s formative circumstances.
K1 Externalism
K1 Excuses
K1 Reactive attitudes
K1 Strawson
K1 Moral Responsibility
DO 10.1007/s10677-013-9457-9