Moral Responsibility: Justifying Strawson and the Excuse of Peculiarly Unfortunate Formative Circumstances
P.F. Strawson’s theory of moral responsibility remains eminently influential. However, moral philosophers such as G. Watson and T.M. Scanlon have called into question it explanatory basis, which grounds moral responsibility in human nature and interpersonal relationships. They demand a deeper normat...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Έκδοση: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2014
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Στο/Στη: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Έτος: 2014, Τόμος: 17, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 545-557 |
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Strawson
B Excuses B Externalism B Reactive attitudes B Moral Responsibility |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Σύνοψη: | P.F. Strawson’s theory of moral responsibility remains eminently influential. However, moral philosophers such as G. Watson and T.M. Scanlon have called into question it explanatory basis, which grounds moral responsibility in human nature and interpersonal relationships. They demand a deeper normative explanation for when it is appropriate to modify or mollify the reactive attitudes. In this paper, following A. Sneddon, I argue that the best interpretation of Strawson is an externalistic one which construes moral responsibility as an interpersonal social competence, as this approach uniquely satisfies Strawson’s demand that we justify the reactive attitudes from within the participant perspective. I then show that this is the only interpretation capable of preserving Strawson’s well-known excuse of being peculiarly unfortunate in one’s formative circumstances. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-013-9457-9 |