Karol Wojtyla’s Conception of Personhood from the Perspective of Cognitive Sciences
We use the term “person” when we want to point out that human existence is unrepeatable and unique. The assumption that man is a person constitutes a basis for the belief in the dignity, efficacy, and responsibility of the human individual. Karol Wojtyla built his conception of the person in the con...
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Lade...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego
2021
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| In: |
Philosophy & canon law
Jahr: 2021, Band: 7, Heft: 1, Seiten: 1-17 |
| normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Johannes Paul, II., Papst 1920-2005
/ Person
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| IxTheo Notationen: | VA Philosophie |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Free Will
B Human Nature B cognitive sciences B Person B Karol Wojtyla |
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Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Zusammenfassung: | We use the term “person” when we want to point out that human existence is unrepeatable and unique. The assumption that man is a person constitutes a basis for the belief in the dignity, efficacy, and responsibility of the human individual. Karol Wojtyla built his conception of the person in the context of theological and philosophical discussions. Even though Wojtyła’s conception has been given a great deal of scholarly attention, it is worthwhile to juxtapose it with contemporary anthropological theories that derive from cognitive sciences. Cognitivists usually base their theories on biological and sociological premises. Some conclusions arrived at in the area of the cognitive sciences lead to mind-brain reductionism, a theory in which the human being is regarded as a body endowed with the function of the brain and as an entity whose individual traits are shaped by its social and cultural environment. This position undermines the ideas of free will and the substantial singularity of the human person. However, debates with this position have worked out a non-reductionist alternative, a theory known as emergentism. This theory treats the human mind as a distinct faculty, one which emerges as a phase in the brain’s development. Emergentists base their reasoning on the assumptions that the body is a unity and that the mind is not identical with it. It is my belief that emergentism can be fruitfully applied to the dynamic understanding of the person put forward by Wojtyła in the middle of the 20th century. |
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| ISSN: | 2451-2141 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: Philosophy & canon law
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.31261/PaCL.2021.07.1.06 |