God is (Probably) a Cause among Causes: Why the Primary/Secondary Cause Distinction Doesn’t Help in Developing Non-interventionist Accounts of Special Divine Action

Several recent authors have suggested that much of the discussion on divine action is flawed since it presupposes that divine and human agency compete. Such authors advocate a re-appropriation of the Scholastic distinction between primary and secondary causation which, it is suggested, solves many p...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Kittle, Simon (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
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Publicado: Routledge 2022
En: Theology and science
Año: 2022, Volumen: 20, Número: 2, Páginas: 247-262
Clasificaciones IxTheo:AB Filosofía de la religión
NBC Dios
Otras palabras clave:B Divine Action
B divine concurrence
B primary causation
B special divine action
Acceso en línea: Volltext (kostenfrei)
Descripción
Sumario:Several recent authors have suggested that much of the discussion on divine action is flawed since it presupposes that divine and human agency compete. Such authors advocate a re-appropriation of the Scholastic distinction between primary and secondary causation which, it is suggested, solves many problems in the theology of divine action. This article critiques defences of the primary/secondary cause distinction based on appeals to analogical predication, and argues that, even assuming an adequate account of the primary/secondary cause distinction, the distinction provides no help in the development of non-interventionist accounts of special divine action.
ISSN:1474-6719
Obras secundarias:Enthalten in: Theology and science
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1080/14746700.2022.2057468