Self-Knowledge and Its Limits
A philosophical account of self-knowledge should offer more than an epistemological explanation of first-personal privilege. It should also address the many cases where the first-person perspective is not so privileged, and account for the importance of self-knowledge to a person’s social and psycho...
Autore principale: | |
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Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
Lingua: | Inglese |
Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Pubblicazione: |
Brill
2018
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In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Anno: 2018, Volume: 15, Fascicolo: 1, Pagine: 85-95 |
Altre parole chiave: | B
Agency
B Consciousness B Rationality B Psychology B Self-knowledge B Reasons B Responsibility |
Accesso online: |
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Riepilogo: | A philosophical account of self-knowledge should offer more than an epistemological explanation of first-personal privilege. It should also address the many cases where the first-person perspective is not so privileged, and account for the importance of self-knowledge to a person’s social and psychological well-being. Quassim Cassam’s Self-Knowledge for Humans and John Doris’s Talking to Our Selves both emphasize the importance of these latter tasks, but neither author is wholly successful: Cassam’s argument rests on a gross distortion of the “Rationalist” picture he sets up as a foil, and Doris’s on a skeptical argument that stands in some questionable company. |
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ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
Comprende: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/17455243-01501005 |