RT Article
T1 An Ecumenical Account of Categorical Moral Reasons
JF Journal of moral philosophy
VO 16
IS 2
SP 160
OP 188
A1 Strandberg, Caj
LA English
PB Brill
YR 2019
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1817471007
AB According to an influential way of understanding the debate between internalism and externalism about normative reasons, these theories confront us with a dilemma. Internalism is taken to involve a view about rationality which is considered less philosophically problematic than its competitors, whereas externalism is taken to suggest a more contentious view concerning this notion. However, the assumption that externalism involves a more demanding notion of rationality implies that it is able to account for categorical moral reasons, whereas internalism is unable to do so. In this paper, I outline an ecumenical view about normative reasons which involves the same notion of rationality as internalism, at the same time as it is able to account for categorical moral reasons. Thus, it evades the dilemma.
K1 categorical moral reasons
K1 Practical rationality
K1 Externalism
K1 Internalism
K1 Normative reasons
DO 10.1163/17455243-20170009