RT Article
T1 Intentional Side-Effects of Action*
JF Journal of moral philosophy
VO 10
IS 2
SP 179
OP 203
A1 Scaife, Robin
A1 Webber, Jonathan
LA English
PB Brill
YR 2013
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1817471252
AB Certain recent experiments are often taken to show that people are far more likely to classify a foreseen side-effect of an action as intentional when that side-effect has some negative normative valence. While there is some disagreement over the details, there is broad consensus among experimental philosophers that this is the finding. We challenge this consensus by presenting an alternative interpretation of the experiments, according to which they show that a side-effect is classified as intentional only if the agent considered its relative importance when deciding on the action. We present two new experiments whose results can be explained by our hypothesis but not by any version of the consensus view. In the course of doing so, we develop a methodological critique of the previous literature on this topic and draw from it lessons for future experimental philosophy research.
K1 Moral Psychology
K1 Joshua Knobe
K1 Experimental philosophy
K1 Side-effects
K1 Intentional action
DO 10.1163/17455243-4681004