Responsibility and the Demands of Morality
Is it a good objection to a moral theory that it demands a great deal of individual agents? I argue that if we interpret the question to be about the potential welfare costs associated with our moral obligations, the answer must be “no.” However, the demands a moral theory makes can also be measured...
主要作者: | |
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格式: | 电子 文件 |
语言: | English |
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出版: |
Brill
2017
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In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2017, 卷: 14, 发布: 3, Pages: 315-338 |
Further subjects: | B
agent-centered prerogative
B Impartiality B Utilitarianism B Demandingness B Responsibility B Answerability |
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总结: | Is it a good objection to a moral theory that it demands a great deal of individual agents? I argue that if we interpret the question to be about the potential welfare costs associated with our moral obligations, the answer must be “no.” However, the demands a moral theory makes can also be measured in terms of what it requires us to take responsibility for. I argue that this is distinct from what we may be required to do or give up, and that it provides a conception of demandingness that makes better sense of our intuitive reactions. |
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ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/17455243-46810062 |