Political Liberalism and Political Compliance: Part 2 of The Problem of Political Compliance in Rawls’s Theories of Justice
Abstract Three interlocking features appear to underpin Rawls’s justification of political compliance within the context of political liberalism: namely, a specific territory; a specific society; and a specific conception of what it is to be reasonable. When any one feature is subject to critical ex...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Brill
2006
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| Em: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Ano: 2006, Volume: 3, Número: 2, Páginas: 135-157 |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
political duties
B Political Liberalism B philosophical anarchism B Rawls B Political Obligation |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Resumo: | Abstract Three interlocking features appear to underpin Rawls’s justification of political compliance within the context of political liberalism: namely, a specific territory; a specific society; and a specific conception of what it is to be reasonable. When any one feature is subject to critical examination, while presupposing that the other two are acceptable, Rawls’s argument for political compliance may seem persuasive. But when all three features are critically examined together, his justification of political compliance within political liberalism can be seen to lack cogency. Thus, political compliance fails to be justified by a free-standing political liberalism. |
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| ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/1740468106065489 |