Moral Status, Speciesism, and Liao's Genetic Account
Abstract This paper offers several criticisms of the account of rightholding laid out in S. Matthew Liao's recent paper 'The Basis of Human Moral Status'. I argue that Liao's account both does too much and too little: it grants rightholder status to those who may not deserve it,...
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Brill
2010
|
| Dans: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Année: 2010, Volume: 7, Numéro: 3, Pages: 387-396 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Speciesism
B MORAL AGENCY B INSTRUMENTAL VALUE B Intrinsic Value B MORAL STATUS |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | Abstract This paper offers several criticisms of the account of rightholding laid out in S. Matthew Liao's recent paper 'The Basis of Human Moral Status'. I argue that Liao's account both does too much and too little: it grants rightholder status to those who may not deserve it, and it does not provide grounds for offering such status to those who arguably do deserve it. Given these troubling aspects of his approach, I encourage Liao to abandon his 'physical basis of moral agency' account of moral status and instead adopt a position closer to a traditional 'speciesist' view. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/174552410X511518 |