Retribution and Organic Unities
Abstract G.E. Moore argued that his principle of organic unities, according to which the value of a whole is to be distinguished from the value of the sum of its parts, is consistent with a retributivist view of punishment: both crime and punishment are intrinsic evils but the combination of the cri...
Autor principal: | |
---|---|
Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
Idioma: | Inglês |
Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado em: |
Brill
2006
|
Em: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Ano: 2006, Volume: 3, Número: 3, Páginas: 351-358 |
Outras palavras-chave: | B
Moore
B Bentham B Organic Unities B Retribution B Dancy |
Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Resumo: | Abstract G.E. Moore argued that his principle of organic unities, according to which the value of a whole is to be distinguished from the value of the sum of its parts, is consistent with a retributivist view of punishment: both crime and punishment are intrinsic evils but the combination of the crime with the punishment of its perpetrator is less bad in itself than the crime unpunished. Moore’s principle excludes any form of retributivism that regards the punishment of a guilty person as an intrinsic good. Jonathan Dancy offers a different account of such unities on which, pace Moore, value does not necessarily stay the same from one context to another. This alternative account is defended, but still seems to create difficulties for various forms of retributivism. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/1740468106071231 |