On the Possibility of Corporate Apologies*
This paper argues against an individualist challenge to the possibility of corporate apologies. According to this challenge, corporations always and only act through their members; thus they are not the sorts of entities that can apologize. Consequently there can be no corporate apologies. Against t...
Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | ; |
---|---|
Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Έκδοση: |
Brill
2013
|
Στο/Στη: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Έτος: 2013, Τόμος: 10, Τεύχος: 6, Σελίδες: 741-762 |
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
eliminative individualism
B Corporations B Apologies |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Σύνοψη: | This paper argues against an individualist challenge to the possibility of corporate apologies. According to this challenge, corporations always and only act through their members; thus they are not the sorts of entities that can apologize. Consequently there can be no corporate apologies. Against this challenge, this paper argues that even if corporate acts can be analyzed as acts by individuals within certain relationships, there can still be corporate apologies. This paper offers a noneliminative individualist account of such apologies. The paper also responds to various substantive objections to the possibility of such apologies. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/17455243-4681003 |