Moral Vegetarianism from a Very Broad Basis
Abstract This paper defends a qualified version of moral vegetarianism. It defends a weak thesis and, more tentatively, a strong thesis, both from a very broad basis that assumes neither that animals have rights nor that they are entitled to equal consideration. The essay's only assumption abou...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Brill
2009
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| Dans: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Année: 2009, Volume: 6, Numéro: 2, Pages: 143-165 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
UNNECESSARY HARM
B Animals B Meat-eating B FAMILY FARMS B FACTORY FARMS B MORAL STATUS B Vegetarianism |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | Abstract This paper defends a qualified version of moral vegetarianism. It defends a weak thesis and, more tentatively, a strong thesis, both from a very broad basis that assumes neither that animals have rights nor that they are entitled to equal consideration. The essay's only assumption about moral status, an assumption defended in the analysis of the wrongness of cruelty to animals, is that sentient animals have at least some moral status. One need not be a strong champion of animal protection, then, to embrace moral vegetarianism. One need only assume some reasonable view of animals' moral status. |
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| ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/174552409X402313 |