Moral Vegetarianism from a Very Broad Basis
Abstract This paper defends a qualified version of moral vegetarianism. It defends a weak thesis and, more tentatively, a strong thesis, both from a very broad basis that assumes neither that animals have rights nor that they are entitled to equal consideration. The essay's only assumption abou...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Опубликовано: |
Brill
2009
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| В: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Год: 2009, Том: 6, Выпуск: 2, Страницы: 143-165 |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
UNNECESSARY HARM
B Animals B Meat-eating B FAMILY FARMS B FACTORY FARMS B MORAL STATUS B Vegetarianism |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Итог: | Abstract This paper defends a qualified version of moral vegetarianism. It defends a weak thesis and, more tentatively, a strong thesis, both from a very broad basis that assumes neither that animals have rights nor that they are entitled to equal consideration. The essay's only assumption about moral status, an assumption defended in the analysis of the wrongness of cruelty to animals, is that sentient animals have at least some moral status. One need not be a strong champion of animal protection, then, to embrace moral vegetarianism. One need only assume some reasonable view of animals' moral status. |
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| ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/174552409X402313 |