Consequentializing Moral Dilemmas

The aim of the consequentializing project is to show that, for every plausible ethical theory, there is a version of consequentialism that is extensionally equivalent to it. One challenge this project faces is that there are common-sense ethical theories that posit moral dilemmas. There has been som...

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Auteur principal: Suikkanen, Jussi (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Brill 2020
Dans: Journal of moral philosophy
Année: 2020, Volume: 17, Numéro: 3, Pages: 261-289
Sujets non-standardisés:B consequentializing
B Moral Dilemmas
B Ethical Theory
B Consequentialism
B Normative ethics
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Résumé:The aim of the consequentializing project is to show that, for every plausible ethical theory, there is a version of consequentialism that is extensionally equivalent to it. One challenge this project faces is that there are common-sense ethical theories that posit moral dilemmas. There has been some speculation about how the consequentializers should react to these theories, but so far there has not been a systematic treatment of the topic. In this article, I show that there are at least five ways in which we can construct versions of consequentialism that are extensionally equivalent to the ethical theories that contain moral dilemmas. I argue that all these consequentializing strategies face a dilemma: either they must posit moral dilemmas in unintuitive cases or they must rely on unsupported assumptions about value, permissions, requirements, or options. I also consider this result’s consequences for the consequentializing project.
ISSN:1745-5243
Contient:Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/17455243-01703001