RT Article
T1 On Indirectly Self-defeating Moral Theories
JF Journal of moral philosophy
VO 5
IS 3
SP 384
OP 393
A1 Wiland, Eric
LA English
PB Brill
YR 2008
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1817476785
AB Abstract Derek Parfit has notably argued that while a moral theory should not be directly self-defeating, there is nothing necessarily wrong with a moral theory that is only indirectly self-defeating. Here I resist this line of argument. I argue instead that indirectly self-defeating moral theories are indeed problematic. Parfit tries to sidestep the oddities of indirectly self-defeating theories by focusing on the choice of dispositions rather than actions. But the very considerations that can make it impossible to achieve a theory's aims if we try to do what the theory recommends can also make it impossible to achieve a theory's aims if we instead try to adopt the dispositions the theory recommends. What makes a theory indirectly self-defeating has little to do with the object of choice, but with the nature of choosing itself.
K1 SELF-DEFEATING
K1 PARFIT
K1 Utilitarianism
K1 INDIRECT
K1 DISPOSITION
DO 10.1163/174552408X369727