RT Article
T1 Can’t Complain
JF Journal of moral philosophy
VO 15
IS 2
SP 117
OP 135
A1 Norlock, Kathryn J.
LA English
PB Brill
YR 2018
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/181747698X
AB Philosophers generally prescribe against complaining, or endorse only complaints directed to rectification of the circumstances. Notably, Aristotle and Kant aver that the importuning of others with one’s pains is effeminate and should never be done. In this paper, I reject the prohibition of complaint. The gendered aspects of Aristotle’s and Kant’s criticisms of complaint include their deploring a self-indulgent “softness” with respect to pain, yielding to feelings at the expense of remembering one’s duties to others and one’s own self-respect. I argue that complaining may also take the form of mindful attention to shared suffering. A complainer may observe affective duties, such as commiseration and invitations to disclose pains. Against more contemporary views that justify only constructive complaints directed to change, I suggest that quotidian, unconstructive complaining sometimes fulfills important social functions, including the amelioration of loneliness and affective solidarity, for the sake of others as well as oneself.
K1 Kant
K1 Complaint
K1 commiseration
K1 Aristotle
K1 affective duties
DO 10.1163/17455243-20170004