Explaining Moral Knowledge
In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge. First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood as the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Published: |
Brill
2014
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In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2014, Volume: 11, Issue: 1, Pages: 35-56 |
Further subjects: | B
Moral Knowledge
B Principles B Particularism B generalism B moral epistemology |
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