Nudges and hard choices
Nudges are small changes in the presentation of options that make a predictable impact on people's decisions. Proponents of nudges often claim that they are justified as paternalistic interventions that respect autonomy: they lead people to make better choices, while still letting them choose f...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2022
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| Στο/Στη: |
Bioethics
Έτος: 2022, Τόμος: 36, Τεύχος: 9, Σελίδες: 948-956 |
| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | NBE Ανθρωπολογία NCH Ιατρική Ηθική |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Nudges
B incomplete preferences B choice architecture B Autonomy |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Σύνοψη: | Nudges are small changes in the presentation of options that make a predictable impact on people's decisions. Proponents of nudges often claim that they are justified as paternalistic interventions that respect autonomy: they lead people to make better choices, while still letting them choose for themselves. However, existing work on nudges ignores the possibility of “hard choices”: cases where a person prefers one option in some respects, and another in other respects, but has no all-things-considered preference between the two. In this paper, I argue that many significant medical decisions are hard choices that provide patients with an opportunity to exercise a distinctive sort of “formative autonomy” by settling their preferences and committing themselves to weigh their values in a particular way. Since nudges risk infringing formative autonomy by depriving patients of this opportunity, their use in medical contexts should be sensitive to this risk. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13091 |