Omniscience and experience
My conclusions are the following:, We can distinguish between two sorts of kowledge: intellectual knowledge (knowledge of true propositions) and experiential knowledge (knowledge of how certain experiences feel)., If we want the doctrine of divine omniscience to be theologically relevant, we will ha...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
1991
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| Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 1991, Volume: 30, Numéro: 2, Pages: 89-102 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Experiential Knowledge
B True Proposition B Human Nature B Divine Nature B Vast Knowledge |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | My conclusions are the following:, We can distinguish between two sorts of kowledge: intellectual knowledge (knowledge of true propositions) and experiential knowledge (knowledge of how certain experiences feel)., If we want the doctrine of divine omniscience to be theologically relevant, we will have to assert that divine omniscience involves experiential as well as intellectual omniscience., In order to be omniscient, God does not need to share all the feelings of His creatures with them. However, in order to be experientially omniscient, God must have undergone at least some experiences Himself., If God would be able to have these experiences only by becoming incarnate, God would need the incarnation in order to become omniscient. In this respect human nature would then be more perfect than the divine nature: it would be capable of knowing things which God could only come to know by becoming human. It is therefore preferable to maintain that the divine nature itself is capable of undergoing certain experiences., If the divine nature were incapable of undergoing any experience, God would nevertheless be able to have a vast knowledge of true propositions concerning experiences. For descriptions of experiences and for the evaluation of these descriptions, however, He would be dependent in principle upon His creatures. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/BF00139049 |