RT Article
T1 Kierkegaard on the Problems of Pure Irony
JF Journal of religious ethics
VO 32
IS 3
SP 417
OP 447
A1 Frazier, Brad
LA English
PB Wiley-Blackwell
YR 2004
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1822385199
AB Søren Kierkegaard's thesis, The Concept of Irony, contains an interesting critique of pure irony. Kierkegaard's critique turns on two main claims: (a) pure irony is an incoherent and thus, unrealizable stance; (b) the pursuit of pure irony is morally enervating, psychologically destructive, and culminates in bondage to moods. In this essay, first I attempt to clarify Kierkegaard's understanding of pure irony as “infinite absolute negativity.” Then I set forth his multilayered critique of pure irony. Finally, I consider briefly a distinctly theological component in Kierkegaard's critique. I argue that this feature of Kierkegaard's account can and should be distinguished from the broadly ethical critique of pure irony that I sketch in the second section, even if these components of Kierkegaard's position are found together as a unified whole in The Concept of Irony. My overall goal in this essay is to reveal the subtlety and plausibility of Kierkegaard's critique of pure irony. I also attempt to disclose the richness of the Hegelian account of ethical life to which Kierkegaard recurs in his thesis.
K1 Personal Identity
K1 Sittlichkeit
K1 pure irony
K1 Irony
K1 Kierkegaard
DO 10.1111/j.1467-9795.2004.00173.x