DOES HE PULL IT OFF? A THEISTIC GROUNDING OF NATURAL INHERENT HUMAN RIGHTS?
This paper focuses on two key issues in Nicholas Wolterstorff's Justice: Rights and Wrongs. It argues that Wolterstorff's theistic grounding of inherent rights is not successful. It also argues that Wolterstorff does not provide adequate criteria for determining what exactly these natural...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2009
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| Dans: |
Journal of religious ethics
Année: 2009, Volume: 37, Numéro: 2, Pages: 221-241 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Justice
B human worth B Human Rights B God's Law B natural rights |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | This paper focuses on two key issues in Nicholas Wolterstorff's Justice: Rights and Wrongs. It argues that Wolterstorff's theistic grounding of inherent rights is not successful. It also argues that Wolterstorff does not provide adequate criteria for determining what exactly these natural inherent rights are or criteria that can help us to evaluate competing and contradictory claims about these rights. However, most of Wolterstorff's book is not concerned with the theistic grounding of inherent rights. Instead, it is devoted to a detailed and rigorous articulation of the meaning and defense of a theory of justice as consisting of inherent rights and with showing why this theory of justice is superior to the alternative right order theories that Wolterstorff criticizes. The paper concludes that these accomplishments are not diminished even if Wolterstorff has failed to provide us with a satisfactory theistic grounding of his theory. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-9795 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9795.2009.00384.x |