Trust, Accountability, and Sales Agents’ Dueling Loyalties
This paper argues that current accountability mechanisms are inadequate to ensure that straight-commissioned agents meet their fiduciary obligations to their clients. In doing so, using agency theory, it revisits how the straight-commission compensation system creates agents’ dueling loyalties and r...
| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
|---|---|
| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Lade...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
1996
|
| In: |
Business ethics quarterly
Jahr: 1996, Band: 6, Heft: 3, Seiten: 289-310 |
| Online Zugang: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper argues that current accountability mechanisms are inadequate to ensure that straight-commissioned agents meet their fiduciary obligations to their clients. In doing so, using agency theory, it revisits how the straight-commission compensation system creates agents’ dueling loyalties and recommends mechanisms of accountability organizations, agents, and/or clients can recognize and employ to ensure agents’ fiduciary obligations to their clients. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2153-3326 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: Business ethics quarterly
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2307/3857461 |