Trust, Accountability, and Sales Agents’ Dueling Loyalties
This paper argues that current accountability mechanisms are inadequate to ensure that straight-commissioned agents meet their fiduciary obligations to their clients. In doing so, using agency theory, it revisits how the straight-commission compensation system creates agents’ dueling loyalties and r...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
1996
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| En: |
Business ethics quarterly
Año: 1996, Volumen: 6, Número: 3, Páginas: 289-310 |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Sumario: | This paper argues that current accountability mechanisms are inadequate to ensure that straight-commissioned agents meet their fiduciary obligations to their clients. In doing so, using agency theory, it revisits how the straight-commission compensation system creates agents’ dueling loyalties and recommends mechanisms of accountability organizations, agents, and/or clients can recognize and employ to ensure agents’ fiduciary obligations to their clients. |
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| ISSN: | 2153-3326 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Business ethics quarterly
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2307/3857461 |