Trust, Accountability, and Sales Agents’ Dueling Loyalties
This paper argues that current accountability mechanisms are inadequate to ensure that straight-commissioned agents meet their fiduciary obligations to their clients. In doing so, using agency theory, it revisits how the straight-commission compensation system creates agents’ dueling loyalties and r...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Загрузка...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Опубликовано: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
1996
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| В: |
Business ethics quarterly
Год: 1996, Том: 6, Выпуск: 3, Страницы: 289-310 |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Итог: | This paper argues that current accountability mechanisms are inadequate to ensure that straight-commissioned agents meet their fiduciary obligations to their clients. In doing so, using agency theory, it revisits how the straight-commission compensation system creates agents’ dueling loyalties and recommends mechanisms of accountability organizations, agents, and/or clients can recognize and employ to ensure agents’ fiduciary obligations to their clients. |
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| ISSN: | 2153-3326 |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Business ethics quarterly
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2307/3857461 |