Weeding Out Flawed Versions of Shareholder Primacy: A Reflection on the Moral Obligations That Carry Over from Principals to Agents

The distinction between what I call nonelective obligations and discretionary obligations, a distinction that focuses on one particular thread of the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, helps us to identify the obligations that carry over from principals to agents. Clarity on this issu...

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Autor principal: Mejia, Santiago (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
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Publicado: Cambridge Univ. Press 2019
En: Business ethics quarterly
Año: 2019, Volumen: 29, Número: 4, Páginas: 519-544
Otras palabras clave:B shareholder theory
B Gobierno corporativo
B perfect duties
B Shareholder primacy
B agency ethics
B imperfect duties
Acceso en línea: Presumably Free Access
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Sumario:The distinction between what I call nonelective obligations and discretionary obligations, a distinction that focuses on one particular thread of the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, helps us to identify the obligations that carry over from principals to agents. Clarity on this issue is necessary to identify the moral obligations within “shareholder primacy” (i.e., “shareholder theory”), which conceives of managers as agents of shareholders. My main claim is that the principal-agent relation requires agents to fulfill nonelective obligations, but it does not always require (and sometimes actually prohibits) discharging discretionary obligations. I show that the requirement to fulfill nonelective obligations is more far-reaching than has been acknowledged by most defenders and critics of shareholder primacy. But I also show that managers are not bound by certain discretionary obligations like charity, showing that their moral obligations are more circumscribed than the obligations that apply to human beings in general.
ISSN:2153-3326
Obras secundarias:Enthalten in: Business ethics quarterly
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1017/beq.2019.18