Response to Williams: Selfishness Is Not Enough

Abstract. I agree with George Williams's most significant point: both questions and answers about our moral natures lie in our biological origins. He fails, however, to show that nature is morally evil and that therefore we should vigilantly resist it. The products of evolution are morally neut...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Ruse, Michael (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Wiley-Blackwell 1988
In: Zygon
Year: 1988, Volume: 23, Issue: 4, Pages: 413-416
Further subjects:B Moral Sense
B Theodicy
B Selfishness
B Naturalistic Fallacy
B Adaptation
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Parallel Edition:Non-electronic

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