Response to Williams: Selfishness Is Not Enough
Abstract. I agree with George Williams's most significant point: both questions and answers about our moral natures lie in our biological origins. He fails, however, to show that nature is morally evil and that therefore we should vigilantly resist it. The products of evolution are morally neut...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Wiley-Blackwell
1988
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| Em: |
Zygon
Ano: 1988, Volume: 23, Número: 4, Páginas: 413-416 |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Moral Sense
B Theodicy B Selfishness B Naturalistic Fallacy B Adaptation |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Não eletrônico
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| Resumo: | Abstract. I agree with George Williams's most significant point: both questions and answers about our moral natures lie in our biological origins. He fails, however, to show that nature is morally evil and that therefore we should vigilantly resist it. The products of evolution are morally neutral, but the human moral sense is arguably a positive good. Morality is functional. It does not require ultimate justification in the sense of correspondence with or attack upon reality “out there.” It is an adaptation “intended” to make us social, and sociality—with its sense of right and wrong—makes us fitter than otherwise |
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| ISSN: | 1467-9744 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Zygon
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9744.1988.tb00854.x |