Neuroethics, Painience, and Neurocentric Criteria for the Moral Treatment of Animals
Neuroscience affords knowledge that can be leveraged in the ontological valuation of individuals, groups, and species. Sociocultural sentiments, norms, and mores may impede embracing such knowledge to revise moral attitudes, ethics, and policies. We argue that the practices of neuroethics will be va...
Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | ; |
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Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Έκδοση: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
2014
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Στο/Στη: |
Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics
Έτος: 2014, Τόμος: 23, Τεύχος: 2, Σελίδες: 163-172 |
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Pain
B Animals B neurocentric criteria B Animal welfare B Neuroethics |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Σύνοψη: | Neuroscience affords knowledge that can be leveraged in the ontological valuation of individuals, groups, and species. Sociocultural sentiments, norms, and mores may impede embracing such knowledge to revise moral attitudes, ethics, and policies. We argue that the practices of neuroethics will be valuable in that they ground ethico-legal discourse in (1) naturalistic philosophy; (2) the current epistemological capital of neuroscience; (3) the issues, problems, and solutions arising in and from neuroscientific research and its applications; and 4) the use of neurocentric criteria—such as painience—to define and resolve ethical decisions regarding attitudes toward and treatment of nonhuman animals. |
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ISSN: | 1469-2147 |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0963180113000698 |