Awe’s Place in Ethics

After a period of relative neglect, awe has been the focus of substantial empirical work in psychology and has also begun to receive some philosophical attention. Thus far, though, little attention has been devoted to a line of reasoning present in the literature on environmental ethics that moves f...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Coates, Ashley (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2022
Dans: Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2022, Volume: 25, Numéro: 5, Pages: 851-864
Sujets non-standardisés:B Awe and ethics
B Environmental Ethics
B Bioethics
B The moral status of non-persons
B Awe
Accès en ligne: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Description
Résumé:After a period of relative neglect, awe has been the focus of substantial empirical work in psychology and has also begun to receive some philosophical attention. Thus far, though, little attention has been devoted to a line of reasoning present in the literature on environmental ethics that moves from being awe-inspiring to being worthy of preservation. I argue here that this neglect ought to be remedied, as this argument potentially has a significant role to play in various ethical contexts involving non-persons. I also identify key questions that would need to be addressed in delivering an all-things-considered verdict on this argument, and argue that the argument is largely independent of empirical work on the ‘pro-social effects’ of awe. My primary goal is to motivate, and provide a clear direction for, further work devoted to the prospects and implications of this line of reasoning.
ISSN:1572-8447
Contient:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-022-10325-5