Knowledge as a Mental State in Muʿtazilite Kalām
It is commonly accepted that the definition of knowledge is not among the main epistemological concerns of the period between Plato and Edmund Gettier. Kalām is an exception to the rule. Kalām scholars provide a detailed philosophical analysis of the difference between knowledge and mere true belief...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
|---|---|
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Brill
2022
|
| Στο/Στη: |
Oriens
Έτος: 2022, Τόμος: 50, Τεύχος: 3/4, Σελίδες: 244-279 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
factive mental states
B analysis of knowledge B internalism and externalism (justification) B Muʿtazilism |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Σύνοψη: | It is commonly accepted that the definition of knowledge is not among the main epistemological concerns of the period between Plato and Edmund Gettier. Kalām is an exception to the rule. Kalām scholars provide a detailed philosophical analysis of the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. In this article, I am focusing on the analysis of knowledge in one tradition of kalām, Bahšamite Muʿtazilism. I will argue that knowledge is a factive mental state for the Bahšamites. I will also show that the Bahšamite definition of knowledge is a combination of internalism and externalism with respect to justification. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1877-8372 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Oriens
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/18778372-12340016 |