Knowledge as a Mental State in Muʿtazilite Kalām
It is commonly accepted that the definition of knowledge is not among the main epistemological concerns of the period between Plato and Edmund Gettier. Kalām is an exception to the rule. Kalām scholars provide a detailed philosophical analysis of the difference between knowledge and mere true belief...
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Brill
2022
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| Dans: |
Oriens
Année: 2022, Volume: 50, Numéro: 3/4, Pages: 244-279 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
factive mental states
B analysis of knowledge B internalism and externalism (justification) B Muʿtazilism |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Résumé: | It is commonly accepted that the definition of knowledge is not among the main epistemological concerns of the period between Plato and Edmund Gettier. Kalām is an exception to the rule. Kalām scholars provide a detailed philosophical analysis of the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. In this article, I am focusing on the analysis of knowledge in one tradition of kalām, Bahšamite Muʿtazilism. I will argue that knowledge is a factive mental state for the Bahšamites. I will also show that the Bahšamite definition of knowledge is a combination of internalism and externalism with respect to justification. |
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| ISSN: | 1877-8372 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Oriens
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/18778372-12340016 |