RT Article
T1 A New Moral Argument for the existence of God
JF International journal for philosophy of religion
VO 93
IS 1
SP 25
OP 38
A1 Loke, Andrew Ter Ern
LA English
PB Springer Nature B. V
YR 2023
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1837051879
AB I offer a new deductive formulation of the Moral Argument for the existence of God which shows how one might argue for the conclusion that, if one affirms moral realism (traditionally understood as a metaethical view which acknowledges the existence of objective moral truths), one should affirm theism. The new formulation shows that these objective moral truths are either brute facts, or they are metaphysically grounded in an impersonal entity, a non-divine personal entity, or a divine personal entity i.e., God. I illustrate how the alternatives to God can in principle be excluded based on the essential characteristics of those alternative hypotheses and of certain objective moral truths. I demonstrate that my deductive formulation is better than other formulations, and that it is helpful for future work on the Moral Argument.
K1 Euthyphro dilemma
K1 Theistic metaethics
K1 Moral Obligation
K1 Moral ontology
K1 Moral argument
DO 10.1007/s11153-022-09842-1