How to evaluate managerial nudges
A central reason to worry that managers should not use nudges to influence employees is that doing so fails to treat employees as rational and/or autonomous (RA). Recent nudge defenders have marshaled a powerful line of response against this worry: in general, nudges treat us as the kind of RA agent...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2023
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| Em: |
Journal of business ethics
Ano: 2023, Volume: 182, Número: 4, Páginas: 1073-1086 |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Managerial authority
B Rationality B Aufsatz in Zeitschrift B Managerial nudges B Autonomy B relational equality |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Resumo: | A central reason to worry that managers should not use nudges to influence employees is that doing so fails to treat employees as rational and/or autonomous (RA). Recent nudge defenders have marshaled a powerful line of response against this worry: in general, nudges treat us as the kind of RA agents we are, because nudges are apt to enhance our limited capacities for RA agency by improving our decision-making environments. Applied to managerial nudges, this would mean that when managers nudge their employees, they generally bolster their employees' limited RA agency and, thus, treat employees as the kinds of RA agents they are. My aim is to vindicate a qualified version of the initial worry from the nudge-defender response and, as a result, provide a clearer, more plausible framework for evaluating managerial nudges than what nudge critics have previously given. I do this, first, by showing how nudge defenders rely on equivocation between two different senses of "treating someone as RA." The value-preserving notion that supports the nudge-defender prescription to protect and enhance RA capacities is different from the authority-recognizing notion that underwrites the initial worry about nudging. Second, I argue that the authority-recognizing notion of treating someone as RA implies that managerial nudges treat employees as RA just when the nudges are compatible with relating to employees as equals. Third, I explain how, to determine when managerial nudges are compatible with relating to employees as equals, we need to consider how employees surrender aspects of their equal, agency-grounded authority to managers. |
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| ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10551-021-05005-w |