A Challenge for the Scaffolding View of Responsibility
According to Victoria McGeer’s "scaffolding view" (SV) (McGeer 2019), responsibility is a matter of moral reasons-sensitivity (MRS) which, in turn, requires only a "susceptibility to the scaffolding power of the reactive attitudes, experienced as a form of moral address" (2019: 3...
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
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Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2023
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In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2023, Volume: 26, Issue: 1, Pages: 73-90 |
Further subjects: | B
Instrumentalist accounts of responsibility
B Reactive attitudes B Moral Autonomy B Moral influence theories B Scaffolding view of responsibility B Moral Worth B Moral reasons-sensitivity |
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520 | |a According to Victoria McGeer’s "scaffolding view" (SV) (McGeer 2019), responsibility is a matter of moral reasons-sensitivity (MRS) which, in turn, requires only a "susceptibility to the scaffolding power of the reactive attitudes, experienced as a form of moral address" (2019: 315). This claim prompts a prima facie challenge: doesn’t this susceptibility lead to doing the right things for the wrong reasons? Although the SV offers a nuanced and sophisticated answer to this challenge, one that moreover respects the social nature of moral knowledge and the fragility of moral motivation, it does not succeed. It redefines MRS to fit our responsibility practices in a way that overlooks our (fragile) capacity for "genuine MRS." The first and primary objective of this paper is to contrast SV-MRS with genuine MRS. The second objective is to suggest that rather than redefining MRS (which is both unwarranted and costly), we should accept that there is a gap between our practices (and thus responsible agency) and genuine MRS. | ||
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