A Challenge for the Scaffolding View of Responsibility

According to Victoria McGeer’s "scaffolding view" (SV) (McGeer 2019), responsibility is a matter of moral reasons-sensitivity (MRS) which, in turn, requires only a "susceptibility to the scaffolding power of the reactive attitudes, experienced as a form of moral address" (2019: 3...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Gogoshin, Dane Leigh (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2023
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2023, Volume: 26, Issue: 1, Pages: 73-90
Further subjects:B Instrumentalist accounts of responsibility
B Reactive attitudes
B Moral Autonomy
B Moral influence theories
B Scaffolding view of responsibility
B Moral Worth
B Moral reasons-sensitivity
Online Access: Volltext (kostenfrei)

MARC

LEADER 00000caa a22000002 4500
001 1843544970
003 DE-627
005 20240327080246.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 230425s2023 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a 10.1007/s10677-022-10340-6  |2 doi 
035 |a (DE-627)1843544970 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP1843544970 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 1  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Gogoshin, Dane Leigh  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
245 1 2 |a A Challenge for the Scaffolding View of Responsibility 
264 1 |c 2023 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a According to Victoria McGeer’s "scaffolding view" (SV) (McGeer 2019), responsibility is a matter of moral reasons-sensitivity (MRS) which, in turn, requires only a "susceptibility to the scaffolding power of the reactive attitudes, experienced as a form of moral address" (2019: 315). This claim prompts a prima facie challenge: doesn’t this susceptibility lead to doing the right things for the wrong reasons? Although the SV offers a nuanced and sophisticated answer to this challenge, one that moreover respects the social nature of moral knowledge and the fragility of moral motivation, it does not succeed. It redefines MRS to fit our responsibility practices in a way that overlooks our (fragile) capacity for "genuine MRS." The first and primary objective of this paper is to contrast SV-MRS with genuine MRS. The second objective is to suggest that rather than redefining MRS (which is both unwarranted and costly), we should accept that there is a gap between our practices (and thus responsible agency) and genuine MRS. 
601 |a Challenger 
650 4 |a Instrumentalist accounts of responsibility 
650 4 |a Moral Autonomy 
650 4 |a Moral influence theories 
650 4 |a Moral reasons-sensitivity 
650 4 |a Moral Worth 
650 4 |a Reactive attitudes 
650 4 |a Scaffolding view of responsibility 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t Ethical theory and moral practice  |d Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, 1998  |g 26(2023), 1, Seite 73-90  |h Online-Ressource  |w (DE-627)320527093  |w (DE-600)2015306-5  |w (DE-576)104558555  |x 1572-8447  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:26  |g year:2023  |g number:1  |g pages:73-90 
856 |u https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10677-022-10340-6.pdf  |x unpaywall  |z Vermutlich kostenfreier Zugang  |h publisher [open (via crossref license)] 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10340-6  |x Resolving-System  |z kostenfrei  |3 Volltext 
951 |a AR 
ELC |a 1 
ITA |a 1  |t 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 4314289775 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 1843544970 
LOK |0 005 20230425155808 
LOK |0 008 230425||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-Tue135  |c DE-627  |d DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 935   |a ixzs  |a ixzo 
OAS |a 1 
ORI |a TA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw