How Sinful Is Sin? How Vicious Is Vice? A Modest Defense of the Guise of the Good
We defend the guise of the good thesis in a tradition going back to Socrates and Plato, according to which persons act on the basis of what appears to them as good or the least bad or evil act available to them. This seems contrary to moral experience, but we defend the thesis against plausible coun...
Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | ; |
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Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Έκδοση: |
Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Université Catholique de Louvain
2023
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Στο/Στη: |
TheoLogica
Έτος: 2023, Τόμος: 7, Τεύχος: 2, Σελίδες: 1-15 |
Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | ΚΑΒ Εκκλησιαστική Ιστορία 30-500, Πρώιμος Χριστιανισμός KAJ Εκκλησιαστική Ιστορία 1914-, Σύγχρονη Εποχή NCA Ηθική ΤΒ Αρχαιότητα VA Φιλοσοφία |
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Moral Realism
B Socrates B Subjectivism B Bernard Williams B Plato |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Σύνοψη: | We defend the guise of the good thesis in a tradition going back to Socrates and Plato, according to which persons act on the basis of what appears to them as good or the least bad or evil act available to them. This seems contrary to moral experience, but we defend the thesis against plausible counter-examples in life as well as fiction. We contend that the thesis makes wrong-doing and vice intelligible, but still wrong, dysfunctional and horrific. |
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ISSN: | 2593-0265 |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: TheoLogica
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.14428/thl.v7i2.66163 |