Liberal–democratic values and philosophers' beliefs about moral expertise
In recent decades, the discipline of bioethics has grown rapidly, as has the practice of ethical consultation. Interestingly, this new recognition of the relevance of moral philosophy to our daily life has been accompanied by skepticism among philosophers regarding the existence of moral expertise o...
| Autori: | ; |
|---|---|
| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Caricamento...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Pubblicazione: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2023
|
| In: |
Bioethics
Anno: 2023, Volume: 37, Fascicolo: 6, Pagine: 551-563 |
| Notazioni IxTheo: | NCA Etica NCJ Etica della scienza VA Filosofia ZB Sociologia |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Experimental philosophy
B motivated reasoning B cultural differences B moral expertise B liberal–democratic values |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Riepilogo: | In recent decades, the discipline of bioethics has grown rapidly, as has the practice of ethical consultation. Interestingly, this new recognition of the relevance of moral philosophy to our daily life has been accompanied by skepticism among philosophers regarding the existence of moral expertise or the benefits of philosophical training. In his recent article in Bioethics, William R. Smith suggested that this skepticism is rooted in philosophers' belief that moral expertise is inconsistent with liberal–democratic values, when in fact they are compatible. In this paper, we provide a unique opportunity to empirically examine Smith's observation by utilizing and extending global data on philosophers' beliefs about moral expertise, involving 4087 philosophers from 96 countries. Our findings support Smith's theoretical observation and show that societal levels of support for liberal–democratic values are associated with greater skepticism about moral expertise. We suggest that these findings might be explained by the cognitive process of motivated reasoning and an invalid inference of “is” from “ought.” Consequently, the potential tension between moral expertise and liberal–democratic values is invalidly used for rejecting the existence of moral expertise, while its main and valid implication is for how moral expertise should be applied in liberal–democratic settings. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13171 |