Inference to the Best Explanation, Naturalism, and Theism
De Ray argues that relying on inference to the best explanation (IBE) requires the metaphysical belief that most phenomena have explanations. I object that instead the metaphysical belief requires the use of IBE. De Ray uses IBE himself to establish theism that God is the cause of the metaphysical b...
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| Altri autori: | |
| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Caricamento...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Pubblicazione: |
Equinox
2023
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| In: |
Implicit religion
Anno: 2021, Volume: 24, Fascicolo: 3/4, Pagine: 471-484 |
| (sequenze di) soggetti normati: | B
Fede
/ Metafisica
/ Naturalismo (Filosofia)
/ Teismo
/ Schluss auf die beste Erklärung
/ Induzione
/ Empirismo
/ Razionalismo
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| Notazioni IxTheo: | AB Filosofia delle religioni VA Filosofia VB Ermeneutica; Filosofia |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Enumerative Induction
B Theism B Naturalism B Inference to the Best Explanation |
| Accesso online: |
Accesso probabilmente gratuito Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Riepilogo: | De Ray argues that relying on inference to the best explanation (IBE) requires the metaphysical belief that most phenomena have explanations. I object that instead the metaphysical belief requires the use of IBE. De Ray uses IBE himself to establish theism that God is the cause of the metaphysical belief, and thus he has the burden of establishing the metaphysical belief independently of using IBE. Naturalism that the world is the cause of the metaphysical belief is preferable to theism, contrary to what de Ray thinks. |
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| ISSN: | 1743-1697 |
| Riferimento: | Kritik von "A new epistemological case for theism (2021)"
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| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Implicit religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1558/imre.21371 |