Anti-natalism is incompatible with Theory X

The anti-natalist philosopher David Benatar defends a position asserting that all life is harmful, and that it is, therefore, wrong to have children. In this paper, I critique Benatar's less-discussed claim that his anti-natalism provides solutions to population ethics problems, such as the Non...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Yoshizawa, Fumitake (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Wiley-Blackwell 2024
Dans: Bioethics
Année: 2024, Volume: 38, Numéro: 2, Pages: 114-120
Classifications IxTheo:NBE Anthropologie
NCA Éthique
TK Époque contemporaine
VA Philosophie
Sujets non-standardisés:B non-identity problem
B Anti-natalism
B Theory X
B Mere Addition Problem
B David Benatar
B Repugnant Conclusion
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Résumé:The anti-natalist philosopher David Benatar defends a position asserting that all life is harmful, and that it is, therefore, wrong to have children. In this paper, I critique Benatar's less-discussed claim that his anti-natalism provides solutions to population ethics problems, such as the Non-Identity Problem, the Repugnant Conclusion, and the Mere Addition Problem, all of which are presented in Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons. Since the publication of his Better Never to Have Been, Benatar has continued to claim that its provision of such solutions strengthens his defense of anti-natalism. Although Benatar's view has received much criticism, this argument has not been discussed at length. I undertake a thorough examination of the argument and identify reasons to reject it. The central point of my critique is that the implications of Benatar's views in determining ranges of wrong and not-wrong cases of procreation are extensionally inadequate when applied to the problems of population ethics.
ISSN:1467-8519
Contient:Enthalten in: Bioethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13248