Brain Pioneers and Moral Entanglement: An Argument for Post-trial Responsibilities in Neural-Device Trials
We argue that in implanted neurotechnology research, participants and researchers experience what Henry Richardson has called “moral entanglement.” Participants partially entrust researchers with access to their brains and thus to information that would otherwise be private, leading to created intim...
Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | ; ; |
---|---|
Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Έκδοση: |
Wiley
2024
|
Στο/Στη: |
The Hastings Center report
Έτος: 2024, Τόμος: 54, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 24-33 |
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
neurotechnology
B moral entanglement B post-trial obligation B Dependence B Risk B Vulnerability B neural device B research ethics |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Σύνοψη: | We argue that in implanted neurotechnology research, participants and researchers experience what Henry Richardson has called “moral entanglement.” Participants partially entrust researchers with access to their brains and thus to information that would otherwise be private, leading to created intimacies and special obligations of beneficence for researchers and research funding agencies. One of these obligations, we argue, is about continued access to beneficial technology once a trial ends. We make the case for moral entanglement in this context through exploration of participants’ vulnerability, uncompensated risks and burdens, depth of relationship with the research team, and dependence on researchers in implanted neurotechnology trials. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1552-146X |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Hastings Center, The Hastings Center report
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1002/hast.1566 |