Intention, ethics, and convention in Daoism: Guo Xiang on ziran (self-so) and wuwei (non-action)
Much contemporary scholarship on ziran and wuwei views these concepts, which are often coupled, as being 1) anti-intention, effort, purpose, and self-consciousness; 2) indicative of a distinct type of ethics and/or morality; and 3) a rejection of following custom and convention. This paper will draw...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
|---|---|
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Carfax
2024
|
| Στο/Στη: |
Asian philosophy
Έτος: 2024, Τόμος: 34, Τεύχος: 2, Σελίδες: 99–119 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Zhuangzi
B Ζιράν (Ταοϊσμός) B Laozi B Daoism B Guo Xiang B wuwei |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | Much contemporary scholarship on ziran and wuwei views these concepts, which are often coupled, as being 1) anti-intention, effort, purpose, and self-consciousness; 2) indicative of a distinct type of ethics and/or morality; and 3) a rejection of following custom and convention. This paper will draw largely on the philosophy of Guo Xiang to demonstrate that these widely agreed upon avenues of interpretation are limited and run contrary to other more nuanced readings of ziran and wuwei. I argue that ziran and wuwei are better appreciated as speaking to attitudes, that they should be understood in terms of degrees rather than categories, and that the Laozi and Zhuangzi offer them as advice for ways of reflecting—they are not standardizable ethical rules. In this way, we can see how ziran and wuwei include intention and effort, are anti (most forms of) ethics and morality, and are inherently intertwined with customs and convention. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1469-2961 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Asian philosophy
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2024.2292350 |