Achieving knowledge: a virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity
"When we affirm (or deny) that someone knows something, we are making a value judgment of sorts - we are claiming that there is something superior (or inferior) about that person's opinion, or their evidence, or perhaps about them. A central task of the theory of knowledge is to investigat...
| Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | ; |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Εκτύπωση Βιβλίο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Υπηρεσία παραγγελιών Subito: | Παραγγείλετε τώρα. |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Cambridge [u.a.]
Cambridge Univ. Press
2010
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| Στο/Στη: | Έτος: 2010 |
| Κριτικές: | [Rezension von: Greco, John, 1961-, Achieving knowledge] (2011) (Niederbacher, Bruno, 1967 -)
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| Έκδοση: | 1. publ. |
| Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Γνωσιολογία
/ Νορματιβισμός
/ Reliabilität
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| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Knowledge, Theory of
B Normativity (Ethics) |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Cover (Verlag) |
| Σύνοψη: | "When we affirm (or deny) that someone knows something, we are making a value judgment of sorts - we are claiming that there is something superior (or inferior) about that person's opinion, or their evidence, or perhaps about them. A central task of the theory of knowledge is to investigate the sort of evaluation at issue. This is the first book to make 'epistemic normativity,' or the normative dimension of knowledge and knowledge ascriptions, its central focus. John Greco argues that knowledge is a kind of achievement, as opposed to mere lucky success. This locates knowledge within a broader, familiar normative domain. By reflecting on our thinking and practices in this domain, it is argued, we gain insight into what knowledge is and what kind of value it has for us"--Provided by publisher |
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| Περιγραφή τεκμηρίου: | Literaturverz. S. 197 - 202 Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke |
| ISBN: | 0521193915 |